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In the Supre111e Court of the 
State of Utah 
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cros~appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al., 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
J 
CASE 
NO. 9159 
Answering Brief of Respondent, Utah Savings 
and Loan Association, to Brief of Appellant 
Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With some of the allegations in Appellant's Statement 
of Facts, Respondent agrees. As to others, we think they 
are immaterial to the issues, contrary to specific findings 
of the Trial Court not directly challenged in this appeal, 
and are conclusions, either without basis in the evidence or 
based upon isolated testimony of one witness without regard 
to contradictory testimony appearing elsewhere in the rec-
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2 
ord. Our primary objection to the Statement, however, is 
that we think it is incomplete to properly consider the legal 
issues involved. 
In order to clarify the position of Respondent, we be-
lieve it necessary to restate the facts, as we see them, from 
the pleadings, Trial Court orders, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the evidence, or lack of it, in the 
record. In such manner, it is believed that the f.aots which 
we consider essential to a proper consideration of the cases 
can be added more appropriately, and areas of agreement 
and disagreement with Appellant's Statement will be more 
apparent than if ~an attempt were made to take each indi-
vidual "fact" as stated by the Appellant and either agree 
or disagree therewith or argue its materiality. 
'Dhis appeal involves three separate mortgage fore-
closure actions which were consolidated for trial and were 
tried together in the lower court. In each case, Respond-
ent, fby its Complaint, sought to foreclose construction 
mortgages which had been executed in its favor by Robert 
B. Mecham, as an owner builder, and his wife, Ruth W. Me-
cham, as to ·her statutory dower interest. (Plf. Exhibits 
1-24, Civil 20,575, Exhibits 1-6, Civil No. 20,591, and Ex-
hibits 1-4, ·Civil No. 20,592). The Complaint in Civil No. 
20,575 contains twenty-four separate causes of action to 
foreclose twenty-four separate mortgages on twenty-four 
separate houses in various stages of completion in an area 
in Orem, Utah County, called "La Mesa". The Complaints 
in Civil Nos. 20,591 and 20,592 contain six and four causes 
of action, respectively, to foreclose six separate mortgages 
on six .separate houses referred to as "Schauerhamer" in 
Case No. 20,591, and four separate mortgages on four sep-
arate houses referred to as "Rowley" in Case No. 20,592, 
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which areas are also in Orem. The relative locations of 
these areas are shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 41 in Civil No. 
20,575, and individual plats of the areas are shown by Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 40 in Civil No. 20,575, Exhibit 15 in Civil No. 
20,591, and Exhibit 20, in Civil No. 20,5~2. 
In each of the three cases, the mortgagors and all 
other persons known to claim some interest in the proper-
ties were named as defendants, there being 24 such defend-
ants in Civil No. 20,575, 11 in Civil No. 20,591 and 19 in 
Civil No. 20,592. Most of the defendants were mechanics 
lien claimants under Notices of Lien filed by them, cover-
ing various portions of land from one lot in one area (il)ef. 
Exhibit 78, Civil No. 20,575) to 5 separate areas covering 
more than 100 lots, as in the case of Appellant, on which 
Mecham had commenced the construction of houses, and 
to \vhich they claimed to have furnished materials. There 
were some others such as the United States which claimed 
tax liens as against Mecham, and the Industrial Commis-
sion which claimed a judgment lien as against Mecham. 
Most of the claims of the various defendants have! !been 
settled or purchased by Respondent, and some others have 
been disposed of by orders of the Trial Court, from which 
orders no appeals have been taken. Appellant was made 
a party defendant in each of the three cases because its No-
tice of Lien included the property :sought to be foreclosed, 
but not all of the defendants in each of the cases are the 
same. 
To the Complaints for foreclosure of Respondent's 
separate mortgages in each of the three cases, Appellant 
filed Answers and Cross-claims, which, for all practical 
purposes, were identical. (R. 38, Civil No. 20,575, R. 16, 
Civil No. 20,591, and R .. 13, Civil No. 20,592). Appellant 
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Bet forth therein in all three cases its claim of mechanic's 
lien and in each prayed that the property described in 
Plaintiff's Complaint be sold and the sale proceeds applied 
to the payment of its claims in the amount of $18,653.67 
with interest. 
Five months later, on June 9, 1958, Appellant filed an 
Amended Answer, Counteuclaim, and Cross-claim in each 
of the three cases, and again prayed that the lands de-
scribed in Plaintiff's Complaint be sold and that the pro-
ceeds of the sale be applied to the payment of its lien. ( R. 
79, C'ivil No. 20,575, R. 47, Civil No. 20,592, R. 58, Civil No. 
20,59·2 ) . 
Just prior to the conclusion of the tii:al on December 
17, 1958, Appellant filed a Second Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim and Cross-claim in each case, and again 
prayed in each that the property described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment 
of the lien. (R. 161, Civil No. 20,575, R. 47, Civil No. 20,-
591, R. 85, Civil No. 20,592). 
As will more fully appear herein, the significance of 
Appellant's pleadings is that (1) in neither the original nor 
in the two amended pleadings in each of the three cases did 
Appellant pray for the foreclosure of its whole lien by a 
sale of all the property covered by its lien, and to which it 
claimed to have furnished materials, and (2) the "bond 
law" wasn't mentioned. 
Sometime after the filing of the original Answer and 
Counterclaim, some of the mechanics lien claimants (not 
Appellant) made motions to the court for orders adding 
D. Spencer Grow; D. Spencer Grow, dba Mid-Utah Con-
struction Company and Radio Sales C<WPOration; Mortgage 
Insurance Corporation; Grow Investment Corporation; and 
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Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company, a corporation, as Cross-
defendants in each of the three cases. Over objection of 
Respondent, the Trial Court granted the motion. How-
ever, neither Appellant nor any party to the appeals at bar 
designated for inclusion in the record now before the Court 
either the mortions referred to or the orders grtanting them, 
and for all the record on this appeal shows, there are no 
Cross-defendants in any of the actions. While we will make 
some references to these "Cross-defendants" throughout 
this brief and will :answer Appellant's arguments ooncern-
ing them, we do not concede that ·any of them are properly 
or legally before this HonoraJble Corurt according to the 
record. 
It should be noted at this point that the Notice of Lien 
filed by Appellant and upon which it relies in the three 
cases before the C'ourt (Def. Exhibit 29, Civil No. 20,575) 
is a single or "blanket" lien claiming $18,653.67 on a total 
of 101 buildings situated in O'rem and Provo in five sep-
arate areas, which prolperties were not owned by a com-
mon owner either at the time Appellant's Lien was filed, 
or any other time. No designation is made as to the 
amount claimed against the properties described in the 
Notice of Lien either 1by lot, owner, or area. 
The Trial Court found in each case that generally 
the properties described in Appellant's Notice of Lien are 
as follows: (R. 211, Civil No. 20,575, R. 69, Civil No. 20,-
591, and R. 99, Civil No. 20,592) 
(a) "All of Keyridge Heights, a subdivision, 
owned by Cross-defendants at the times materials 
were furnished by said Ludlow, consisting of 25 lots 
on which have been constructed 23 homes by the said 
Robert B. Mecham under contracts with the said own-
ers.'' 
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(b) "All of Keyridge Heights, Plat "B", owned 
by Cross-defendants at the time Defendant Ludlow 
furnished materials to Defendant Mecham, consisting 
of 35 lots on whieh have been constructed 35 homes 
by Defendant Mecham under contract with said own-
ers, of which all have been substantially completed 
except 11 of said homes which are in various states 
of completion.'' 
(c) "Twelve lots in the Schauerhamer area 
owned by Defendant Robert B. Mecham at the time 
of commencement of construction and on which 12 
homes have been built by the Defendant Mecham, and 
all of which are substantially completed." 
I 
(d) "A parcel of land in Pro~o, Utah, at about 
5th North between 15th and 16 West, consisting of 
about 7.79 acres, divided into lots and owned by De~ 
fendant, Robert B. Mecham, upon which he has con-
structed one 1house as owner builder, but which said 
house has not been completed.'' 
(e) Q "Forty-four lots in La Mesa Subdivision 
owned by Defendant Robert B. Mecham upon which 
he .commenced construction of dwellings on 24 of said 
lots and said dwellings are in various stages of com-
pletion from 45% to 90%". (Emphasis supplied) 
(f) "Four lots in Rowley area owned by Rob-
ert B. Mecham on which 4 homes were built by said 
Mecham, but not fully, completed." 
It will be noted from the foregoing that the majority 
of the homes, some 58, on which Appellant claimed a lien 
are in Keyridge Heights and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" 
owned by three Cross-defendants. Neither these, the Pro-
vo property nor six of the twelve Sc.hauerhamer properties 
are sought to be foreclosed by any of the parties to the ac-
tions before the Court. 
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The finding of the Trial Court with respect to the 58 
Keyridge homes is as follows: 
"That commencing August 5, 1955 and continu-
ing to the summer of 1956, Defendant Robert B. Me-
cham, at various times during said period entered in-
to a total of 58 separate contracts with Cross-defend-
ant Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company, a corporation, 
and Cross-defendant D. Spencer Grow, whe,reby the 
said Mecham was to build for the owners of said prop-
erty 58 separate dwellings for a consideration stated 
and agreed upon in each of said contracts; that the 
said Mecham did fully complete 47 of said dwellings, 
and the remaining 11 are substantially, but not fully, 
completed; that the said Mecham has been paid for 
said construction and all extras by the owners of said 
land.'' 
The contracts, each covering a particular lot and stat-
ing a separate consideration, were~ received in evidence as 
plaintiff's Exhibits 42 (1-58), Civil No. 20,575, I 24 (1-58) 
Civil No. 20,591, and 22 (1-58) Civil No. 20,592. 
Because it appeared obvious from the pleadings that 
Appellant was not seeking to foreclose its lien as against 
all the property described in the Nortice of Lien, but was 
claiming the total amount of the lien as against the 34 
properties described in the three eases before the c:ourt, 
Respondent's counsel, at the pre-trial hearing, sought an 
explanation of Appellant's position. He was informed that 
Appellant claimed the fuH amount of the lien against each 
and every single property involved in the three cases be-
fore the Court. (Pr~trial hearing, Page 28-29) 
The proof offered by Appellant at the trial in support 
of its lien as against the 34 properties described in _Respond-
ent's three Complaints was simply that commencing in June 
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1956, and continuing to June 1957, Appellant furnished 
plumbing materials first to Roger Allred who was work-
ing for Mecham, and later to Mecham, of the value of $42,-
423. 60 upon an open account, and that there was due and 
owing by Mecham upon this account the sum of $18,653.67. 
(Tr. 621-656). Appellant's witnesses were emphatic in 
their inability to state the value o[ the matrials which went 
into each property, or even the amounts which were used 
or sold to be used in the separate areas liened. Although 
AJppellant's testimony was also thart it knew that Keyridge 
belonged to Mr. Grow,. and La Mesa belonged to Mecham, 
(Tr. 626), Appellant either failed to keep any records as 
to dates, quantities, or points of delivery as between the 
areas, or if records were kept, for some reason refused to 
introduce them in evidence. Appellant was not the sole 
supplieT of plumbing materials. (Tr. 375) 
In this connection, the Trial Court made findings in 
each of the three cases as follows: (R. 215, Oivil No. 20,-
575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 101, Civil No. 20,592) 
(1) "That during the period commencing June 
1956 and continuing until June 1957, plumbing mate-
rials and supplies were sold to Defendant, Mecham, on 
an open account, Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company, 
and were not sold for use on any particular lot, prop-
erty; or project, described in its Notice of Lien re-
ferred to in Paragraph 12 hereof, and were sold for 
use by the Defendant Mecham in such manner and 
for such use upon lots, properties or projects as Me-
cham should determine." 
(2) "That during the period June 1956 to June 
1957 Defendant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. deliv-
ered said plumbing materials and supplies from its 
place of business in Salt l..;ake City, Utah, to Orem, 
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Utah to the Defendant Mecham mostly by common 
carrier .. and such materials were delivered to Keyridge 
subdivision and to the La Mesa Subdivision, and none 
were delivered by Ludlow to the Schauerhamer, Row-
ley, or Provo areas." 
Respondenrt does not challenge the above findings in 
its brief. 
The Trial Court made a further finding to the effect 
that Appellant knew ·and understood that all of Keyridge 
Subdivision was owned 1by some of the Cross-defendants, 
and that all of La Mesa was owned by Defendant Mecham. 
(R. 215, Civil No. 20,575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 101-
102, Civil No. 20,592). 
The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Appel-
lant and against Defendant Robert B. Mecham for the to~­
tal amount of its open account, (R. 244, Civil No. 20,575, 
R. 80, Civil No. 20,591, R. 121, Civil No. 20,592), but held 
that its purported lien was invalid and that the evidence 
furnished no basis whereby the Court could apportion the 
materials and supplies sold by Appellant to Mecham among 
the numerous tracts of land covered by the lien. (R. 215, 
Civil No. 20,575, R. 73, Civil No. 20,591, R. 102, Civil No. 
20,592). It is from the judgment denying Appcllant a pri-
or lien to Respondent's mortgages upon the properties de-
scribed in Respondent's Complaints that Appellant makes 
this appeal. 
There is no dispute as to the amounts found by the 
Trial Court to be due Respondent by Mecham on its mort-
gages or on the amount found to be due Appellant by Me-
cham on its open account. Neither Mecham nor his ·wife 
has taken any appeal. 
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It also does not appear thart there is any dispute as 
to the facts found by the Trial Court that no work was ac-
tually commenced nor materials deliveTed on any property 
in each of the three areas involved in the cases at bar un-
til after all the mortgages in each of the areas had first 
been recorded, (R. 210, Civil No. 20,575, R. 67, Civil No. 
20,591, R. 98, Civil No. 20,592), except in the case of the 
prope~ty described in Respondent's Sixth Cause of Action 
in Civil No. 20,591. As to .that latter property only, the 
mortgage sued upon, resulting from a refinancing transac-
tion, was not recorded until June 26, 1957 (R. 67, Civil No. 
20,591), and we concede that since work on that property 
was eommenced prior to the recording of Respondent's 
mortgage, any valid mechanic's lien as against that prop-
erty for the value of any materials furnished "to be used" 
upon that property would be prior in right to that mort-
gage. 
Appellant has filed no supersedeas bond, and pursu-
ant to Decrees in each of the three eases, all of the proper-
ties were sold by the Sheriff in separate parcels in accord-
ance with the laws governing sales upon foreclosure. Re-
spondent bid in each of the properties for a sum equal to 
or less than the amounts found to be due on the mortgages. 
There were no other bidders. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINI)ING AND 
DETERMINING THAT THE LIEN OF APPELLANT IS 
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAIN·ST THE 
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PROPERTIES D ESC R I BE D IN RESPONDENT'S 
COMPLAINTS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT WAS C'ORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
THE BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH O~F THE 
AREAS CO,VERED BY THE LIEN OF APPELLANT 
WAS NOT ONE ENTIRE PROJECT. 
POINT III 
THE ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
FIND THAT MID-UTAH BROADCASTING CO·MPANY 
BECAME LIABLE TO APPE,LLANT FOR MA TE.RIALS 
FURNISHED TO THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY 
CASE NO. 20,591 DE'SIGNATED AS S.CHAUERHAMER 
AREA. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
FIND THAT ROBERT B. MEC~ TOOK TITLE TO 
PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS RO,WLEY AND LA 
MES·A FOR AND ON BEHALF O~F RESPO,NDENT OR 
THlAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT FOR 
RESPONDENT, AND WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING 
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLEID TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST RE-
SPONDENT IN CO,NNECTION WITH THE PROPERTY 
SITUATED IN ROWLEY AND LA IVlESA AREAS BY 
VIRTUE OF SECTION 14-2-2 UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED. 1953. (Bond Law) 
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POINT IV 
'I'HE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
EQUALLY APPORTION APPELLANT'S LIEN. 
POINT VI 
RESPONDENT'S RECORDED MORTGAGES GAVE 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF CONTENTS, AS ACK-
NOWLEDGMENTS WERE FAIR ON THEIR FACES 
AND REOORD TITLE HOLDER, ROBERT B. ME-
CHAM, PROPERLY EXECUTED AND ACKNOWL-
EDGED THE SAME PRIOR TO RECORDING. 
POINT VII 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTO~PPED TO CLAIM 
PRIORITY OF ITS MORTGAGES. 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANT HAS NO VALID AND ENFORCE-
ABLE LIEN AGAINST THE PRO·PERTIES INVOLVED, 
BECAUSE ITS MATERIALS WERE SOLD UPON AN 
OPEN ACCOUNT IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF 
TRADE. 
POINT IX 
IF MECHANIC'S LIENS IN FA VOIR OF APPEL-
LANT ARE DETERMINED TO BE VALID IN SOME 
ASCERTAINABLE AMOUNTS AGAINST THE PROP-
ERTIES INVOLVED, THE MORTGAGES OF RE-
SPONDENT WOULD IN ANY SUCH EVENT BE PRI-
OR IN RIGHT TO SUCH LIENS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING AND 
DETERMINING THAT THE LIEN OF APPELLANT IS 
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AS AGAINST THE 
PROPERTIES D E S C R I BE D IN RESPO,NDENT'S 
CO·MPLAINTS. 
Omiting immaterial wording, Section 38-1-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, pro~des as follows: 
". . . all persons . . . furnishing materials to be 
used in the construction . . . of any building, struc-
ture or improvement upon land . . . shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or ~concerning which they have 
. . . furnished materials . . . " (Emphasis supplied.) 
Section 38-1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"Liens against two or more buildings, mining claims 
or other impro~ements owned by the same person or 
persons may be included in one claim; but in such ease 
the person filing the claim must designate therein the 
amount claimed to be due him on each of such build-
ings, mining claims or orther improvements." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
It is Respondent's position that Appellant's lien is fa-
tally defective under the above statutes since its Notice of 
Lien includes se·veral properties in five separate areas, all 
of which were not owned by the same person or persons, 
and there is no evidence in support of it upon which a de-
termination can be made as to the value of the materials 
furnished "to be used" or actually used "in the construct-
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tion" on any or all of the 34 separate lots foreclosed in the 
three actions before the Court. 
In the absence of any statute such as Section 38-1-8, 
quoted above, aUJthorizing blanket liens, Jones on Liens, 
Volume II at page 337 states the rule as follows: 
''Where houses were built upon distinct lots of 
land, a sepamte lien must generally be filed against 
each house and lot for the work and materials used 
thereon. A single lien against the entire premises for 
the aggregate charge is invalid. It is immaterial that 
at the time of the contract all of the houses and lots 
belonged to the same owner, and that in a suit to fore-
close the lien, he is the sole Defendant; and it is also 
immaterial that the lots are contiguous and in a com-
pact body of land and are without division fences. Nor 
does it aid the lien in such case that the whole work 
is done under one contract for all the buildings." 
Where there is a statute similar to Section 38-1-8, it 
then appears that a blanket lien may be filed on two or 
more properties which are owned by the same owner if the 
materials are furnished by a lien claimant under one single 
contract. See 36 Am. Jur. 116; 10 A.L.R. 1026; 75 A.L.R 
1328. Even then the majority rule is that the lots must 
be contiguous. 10 A.L.R. 1033. 
In the case of Eccles Lumber Co. vs. Martin, 31 Utah 
241, 87 P. 713, ct;his Court held that a blanket lien on more 
than one lot owned by the same person was not invalid 
under Section 38-1-8 UCA because it failed to state in the 
notice the amount claimed on each lot. The rationale of 
that case was that since the property was under one owner-
shop it would make no difference to the owner, and the lien 
was determined to be good as against a demurrer. How-
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ever, the Court also said that the effect of not designating 
the amount claimed in the notice was to postpone the lien 
to the claims of all other lienhoJders who did designate, 
and we assume that this would include the Respondent in 
the cases at bar which did, by its separate mortgages, "des-
ignate" the amount claimed against each property. 
In none of the many cases annortated in the A.L.R 
notes referred to above, and in no case cited by Appellant 
or which we have been able to discover, has a single blan-
ket lien covering property owned in severalty, as in this 
case, been allorwed. 
If the Eccles case doctrine were to be expanded to 
allow a single blanket lien against several parcels of prop-
erty owned by more than one owner, especially where there 
is no designation in the notice as to the amount claimed 
against each parcel or as against each orwner and no proof 
as to the value of the materials furnished "to be ·USed" upon 
or actually used in each pwcel, then, in our opinion, both 
Sections 38-1-3 and 38-1-8, would be nullified and rendered 
meaningless, and would open a Pandora's box of insoJuab~e 
legal and practical problems and uncertainties in the field 
of construction financing. 
Perhaps the most cogent reason why Appellant's Lien 
is unenforceable against the 34 properties involved in this 
appeal is that in the actions before the C'ourt Appellant 
seeks foreclosure of its lien against the 34 properties cov-
ered by Respondent's mortgage only, and not as against 
the 101 properties covered by its lien. The weight of au-
thority is to the effect that a single mechanics lien against 
more than one parcel of land may not be enforced against 
less than the whole of the property Hened, unless it is first 
shown what part of the entire lien properly may be allo-
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cated to the portion against which enforcement is sought. 
Weaver vs. Harland Corp., 10 SE (2) 547, 130 A.L.R 417, 
and Annotation following. 
The record in the three cases before the Court con-
tains nQ evidence as to the proportion of Appellant's total 
lien which could be allocated to eithe~ the 24, 6 or 4 lots 
involved in the three eases. 
In support of its contention as to the validity of its 
lien, Appellant cites the cases of Badger Lumber Company 
vs. Holmes, 62 NW 446; Sarginson vs. Turner, 124 P. 379; 
U. S. Building and Loan vs. Midvale Home Finance Corpo-
ration, 86 Utah 506, 44 P. (2) 1090; Brannan Sand and 
Gravel Company vs. Santa Fe Land Company, 332 P. (2) 
892, and some others, none of which, in our opinion, actu-
ally stand for the proposition contended for, and are not 
contrary to any of the views expressed in this brief. 
The Badger Lumber Company case does not help Ap-
pellant in any respect, and in fact is authority for Respond-
ent's contention that a mechanic's lien cannot he enforced 
against less than the property liened unless it is first shown 
what part of the entire lien may properly be allocated to 
the portion against which enforcement is sought. The 
Court said in that case: 
"If it is sought to charge a part only or the lots 
for material furnished under the contract, then the 
amounrt of the material furnished must be apportioned 
so that the part charged shall bear no greater amount 
of the expense th·an the value of the materials actu-
ally used on said parts in the construction of improve-
ments made thereon." (Emphasis ours) 
This decision was based upon a previous case, Byrd 
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vs. Cochran, 39 Nebraska 109, 58 NW 127, wherein it was 
held that: 
"In order to recover upon a mechanics Lien filed 
against one of the houses and the lot upon which it 
stands, it must be shown that the amount charged 
one house and lot is of the value of the labor performed 
upon and materials furnished for such house, or an 
estimate made by some method or plan which will 
produce a ce·rtain definite result, and mere approxi-
mation or guesswork ~ill not suffice to establish a 
lien." (Emphasis ours) 
In the case of Sarginson vs. Turner, supra, the Court 
held exactly contrary to Appellant's contention and sup-
ports Respondent's position with respect to this point. The 
decision, including the statement of facts, is three para-
graphs in length, the thi~rd of which reads as follows: 
"It appears from the record thart: appellant by one 
written instrument contracted with Gregg for the con-
struction of five dwelling hou·ses, one to be built on 
a lot belonging to a third party, in which the Respond-
ent Turner Investment Company had no interest. It 
further appears that Appellant did not keep separate 
aocounts with these several buildings for labor and ma-
terial furnished in their construction; that, without 
separation or segregation, he now asserts one lien on 
all four houses built on the lots of the Turner Invest-
ment Company, for the sum remaining due on the en-
tire contract. This cannot be done, and, if no other 
reason existed, Appellant's alleged lien would fail for 
the want of segregation of accounts against each prop-
erty." (Emphasis ours) 
In the Brannan case the lien claimant fHed a notice of 
lien against one of three properties owned by three sepa-
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rate owners, and sought foTeclosure of the lien against the 
one property for the full amount of the claim attributable 
to all three proerties. The claim was made under a con-
tract "to surface and pave a 1567 foot roadway." The 
paved area was on and traversed the three separate pieces 
of prope~y. The Coill't held that the one property liened 
cotrld not be charged with the full amount expended upon 
all threer but that sin~ce the cost of the roadway could be 
easily ealculated on a square foot basis, (the case actually 
indicates that the amount was stipulated to), the amount 
attributable to the property liened could be easily ascer-
tained, and it was proper to allow a lien for the part of the 
tortal attributable to that single property. 
In construing a statute similar to ours, Section 38-1-3 
hereinbefore set forth, that Corurrt said on Page 894: 
"In the express words of the statute, containing, 
as we believe, no ambiguity, there are two limitations 
on the lien involved. First, it is granted only upon 
the propevty upon which the labor, services and ma-
teria[ are bestowed or rendered; second, only to the 
extent of the value of the labor, services and material 
rendered upon the propertY ..... '' (Emphasis, the 
Court's) 
The Court quoted Johnson vs. Bennett, 40 P. 847, 848, 
, in part as follows: 
"By statute . . . the lien is restricted to the land 
of the contracting mvner, or his interest in it, at the 
time of making the contract, and is further restricted 
to the work done 'upon such land' . . . (Emphasis, 
the Court's) 
And, tJhen said: 
" ... By statute, therefore, the inquiry of the 
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Trial Court was limited to determining what labor, 
service, and material were rendered by Plaintiff to the 
property upon which the lien was claimed ... " 
A close reading of this case does not appear to us to 
support Appellant's contention in any respect. 
The case of U.S. Building and Loan vs. Midvale Home 
Finance Corporation, supra, involved a single subdivision, 
and lien claimants who furnished mate~rials for the entire 
subdivision. Foreclosure was sought on the single mort-
gage, and this Court held that the mechanics liens were 
prior to the mortgage because work on the subdivision had 
commenced prior to the recording of the mortgage, and 
that the mechanics Hens were not invalid because the no-
tice failed to state separately the amount and value of 
materials and labor furnished to eHJOh lot in the subdivision. 
It appears to us that the Midvale case is correct on 
its facts, but is not authority for Appellant's position that 
a blanket lien covering 101 properties in five dis.t~nct and 
non-contiguous areas, owned by ,more than one owner at 
all times both before and after work eommenced on the 
first property, can be enforced as against 34 orf those prop-
erties, without a scintilla of evidence as to the amount or 
value of mate~rials either furnished "to be used" or actu-
ally used upon the 34 properties or any of them. Add the 
further facts in the case at bar that Respondent sought 
foreclosure of 34 separate mortgages covering 34 separate 
properties in three separate cases, that there were and 
are mechanics lien claimants and others who claim as 
against separate areas and separate properties in those 
areas, and who furnished identical or similar materials, 
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and it seems apparent that the Midvale case is really not 
in point. 
POINT IT 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
THE BUILDING OF :HOUSES IN EACH OF THE 
AREAS COVERED BY THE LIEN O·F APPELLANT 
WAS NOT ONE ENTIRE PROJECT. 
If, in fact, the building of 101 houses in the five areas 
covered by Appellant's lien was a single project, and Ap-
pellant bona fidely so regarded it, then it would appear to 
us that Appellant ·would have sought foreclosure of its 
whole lien and not merely a portion thereof on the 34 
properties covered by Respondent's 34 mortgages in the 
three cases before the Court. Had that been done, then 
the single project theory might logically have been ad-
vanced and issue thereon properly joined. 
But appellant did not choose to raise this matter 
either by its pleadings or by its inclusion in the Pre-trial 
order, and is, therefore, precluded from raising it on this 
appeal. 
Be that as it may, however, the Findings of Fact of 
the Trial Court based upon the undisputed testimony in 
the record and unchallenged by Appellant in its brief, are 
dead oppo·sed to that theory insofar as the rights of Re-
spondent are concerned. Bearing upon this matter, the 
Trial Court, in all three eases, found the facts substantially 
as rollows: (R. 212-214, Civil No. 20,575 ,R. 70-72, Civil 
No. 20,591, R. 99 A-101, Civil No. 20,592) 
''That the property known as Keyridge Heights 
and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" was acquired in three 
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separate parcels commencing in 1955 and continuing 
in 1956 by three Cross-defendants.'' 
"Thalt 10 of the lots in the Schauerhamer area 
were acquired by Defendant Robert B. Mecham from 
D. Reuben Schauerhamer in the fall of 1955 after the 
said Mecham commenced construction of homes in 
l{eyridge Heights under eontracts with some of the 
Cross-defendants, and the -consideration paid by Me-
cham for said lots was the rebuilding of a house for 
D. Reuben Schauerhamer, all of which was unknown 
to Plaintiff or any of its office,rs or agents or any of 
the Cross-defendants, prior to the summer of 1956, 
when Cvoss-defendant D. Spencer Grow, discovered 
Mecham to be building five homes thereon. 
"That the other two of said lots in the Schauer-
harner area were acquired by the Defendant Robert 
B. Mecham from William Henry Baldwin and Max R. 
Brown for substantial cash considerations, prior to the 
commeneement of any construction thereon, which 
acquisitions were unknown to Plaintiff or any of its 
officers or agents or any of the Cross-defendants.'' 
"That Defendant Robert B. Mecham purchased 
the Provo property from Kenneth Allred in J·une, 1956, 
for about $5,000.00 and sometime thereafter, as own-
er builder, commenced to build a home thereon, all 
without the knowledge of Plalintiff or any of its offi-
cers or agents or any of the Cross-defendants.'' 
''That the four Rowley lots were acquired by 
Robert B. Mecham from Maude G. Rowley, Don E. 
Rowley, Laure J. Rowley, by Warranty Deed dated 
January 15, 1957, for a cash consideration which De-
fendant Mecham paid.'' 
''That the La Mesa property was acquired by 
Robert B. Mecham from Maude G. Rowley, Don E. 
Rowley, Laura J. Rowley, Norman J. Rowley, and 
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Judith Kay Rowley, by Warranty Deed dated January 
29, 1957, for approximately $30,000.00 of which about 
$20,000.00 has been paid by said Mecham." 
"That commencing August 5, 1955 and continu-
ing to the summer of 1956, Defendant Robert B. Me· 
cham, at various times during said period entered in-
to a total of 58 separate contrn.cts with Cross-defend-
ants Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company and Cross-de-
fendant Grow Investment Company, a corporation, 
and Cross-defendant D·. Spencer Grow, whereby the 
said Mecham was to build for the owners of said prop-
erty 58 separate dwellings for a considemtion stated 
and agreed upon in each of said contracts; that the 
said Mecham did fully complete 4 7 of said dwellings 
and the remaining 11 are substantially, but not fully, 
completed; that the said Mecham has been paid for 
said construction and all extras by the owners of said 
land.'' 
"That in the summer of 1956, without the lmowl-
edge or consent of Plaintiff or any of its officers or 
agents and without the knowledge or consent of any 
of the Cross-defendants, Defendant Mecham com-
menced the construction of a dwelling on the Provo 
property as owner builder, which dwelling has been 
substantially completed." 
"That on December 14, 1956 after the recording 
of seven separate mortgages thereon in favor of Plain-
tiff, fue Defendant Mecham, as owner-builder, com-
menced construction on an additional seven dwellings 
on lots in the Schauerhamer area." 
"That on or about February 1, 1957, after the re-
cording of four separate mortgages thereon in f.avor 
of the Plaintiff, Defendan1t Mecham, as owner builder, 
commenced construction of 4 dwellings on the four 
Rowley lots." 
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"That on February 21, 1957, and after the record-
ing of 24 separate mortgages thereon, Defendant Me-
cham as owner builder commenced the .construction 
of 24 dwellings on 24 lots in the La Mesa subdivision. 
''That during the period August 1955 to June 
1957, Defendant Mecham was engaged in a general 
building and contracting business and did work and 
furnished materials and labor in connection with other 
building, including the construction of a home for Wes 
Parks, a house whieh was being sold by a Ward of 
the L.D.S. Church, and work and laJbor on a Bishop's 
Storehouse, and constructed a masonry building on his 
own property; that the suppliers for these endeavors 
were generally the same as those involved in this ac-
tion (20,575) and in Civil Numbers 20,591, and 20,-
592." 
As appears from the foregoing, the property covered 
by ~ppellant's lien was acquired piecemeal by different 
owners over a period of more than one and a half years, 
the Keyridge contracts were entered into separately at 
different times over a period of ne~arly a year, the mort-
gages placed upon the property involved in this lawsuit 
were executed art different times, and at no time can it be 
said that ~the total construction which Mecham did and 
which was covered by Appellant's lien was within the con-
templation of any of the parties, including Appellant, Re-
spondent, and Mecham. Add to this the further f:act that 
the properties were widely scattered in five separate and 
distinct areas in two towns, and we think that under no 
circumstances can it be considered that the building wh~ch 
Mecham did on all the properties covered by AppeHant's 
lien was a single project. 
The reason for Appellant raising this issue is not clear 
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from its brief, but apparently the theory is ·that if con-
struction on all the properties covered by the lien were 
considered to be a single pro~oot, rthen it could claim the 
construction commencement date on the first house in Key-
ridge as the construction commencement date of all of the 
homes involved in the three !Cases before the Court, and, 
therefore, its lien would be prior to the mortgages in these 
cases. The law will not support this theory. As the Kan-
sas Court said in the case of Security Stove Manufactur-
ing Company vs. Sellards, 3 P. (2) 481: 
"This theory is inconsistent with the attitude of 
all parties to the case all the way through, including 
the lienholders. Their claims and their judgments 
were separate and distinct as to the two lots \vhen they 
should have put them together as one claim and one 
judgment, if they expected to consideT their lien as 
only one on barth ~lots, to take advantage of the earlier 
commencement of work on the other lot. No authori-
ties are eited to support this theory, and we are not 
inclined to accept it as applicable to the facts in this 
case.'' 
See also 57 C.J.S. 756, which reads as follows: 
"Where mechanics and materialmen maintain and 
enfiorce their lien sepamtely on two lots belonging to 
the same person, on which buildings are being con-
structed at the same time, they cannot on one lot claim 
the advantage of the earlier commencement of the 
building on the other." 
It requires no i~magination to perceive the inherent dif-
fi~culties in home financing if the law were otherwise. For 
how could a lender or a purehaser ever be sure that lien 
rights had expired even though a particular home may 
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have been completed and occupied for months or even 
years? 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
FIND THAT MID-UTAH BROADCASTING COMPANY 
BECAME LIABLE TO APPELLANT FOR MA TE.RIALS 
FURNISHED TO THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY 
CASE NO. 20,591 DESIGNATED AS SCHAUERHAMER 
AREA. 
We are unable to understand Appellant's point No. III. 
It is assumed, however, that it is referring in that point 
to some one or more of six Schauerhamer lots not involved 
in any of the three cases before the Court, and is asserting 
that one of the Cross-defendants, Mid-Utah Broadcasting 
Company, is liable to Appellant for materials furnished to 
Mecham and used upon some one or more orf those six lots.. 
This liability is predicated on the "bond law" and a claimed 
agency relationship between Cross-defendants and Defend-
ant, Robert B. Mecham. 
If our assumption is correct, then the "bond law" lia-
bility assertion, not having been pleaded and not having 
been reserved as an issue in the pre-trial order, is brand-
new to this law suit and has no application to the fore-
closure of the mortgages involved in the three actions be-
fore the Court. 
The agency proposition vvas rejected by the Tri:al Court 
in both a specific finding of fact and conclusion of law in 
all three cases now before the Court, (R. 217, 222, Civil 
20,575; R. 73, 75, Civil 20,591; R. 102, 105, Civil 20,592) 
and there is no evidence in the record which affirmatively 
establishes any agency relationship whatsoever. In this 
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connection the Trial Court found as a fact in Civil No. 20,-
591 and also in the other two eases, and Appellant makes 
no citation in its brief to any part of the record justifying 
a finding to the eontrary: 
"That Robert B. Mecham was never appointed or 
held out as an agent of D. Spencer Grow, the Plain-
tiff, or any of the -corporate Cross-defendants." 
And as a Conclusion of Law, the Court found: 
"That Defendant Robert B. Mecham was not the 
agent of Plaintiff or agent of Cross-defendants or any 
of them." 
In any event, the record in the eases now before the 
c·ourt contains no evidence whatsoever which would estab-
lish or tend to establish a elaim for any particular amount 
on account of ·any of Appellant's materials which might 
have been used in or upon properties in the Schauerhamer 
area. About all the evidence there is as to the use of rna-
terials in the Schauerhamer area appears on page 18 of 
Appellant's brief wherein he quotes the testimony of Rob-
era B. Mecham as follows: 
Question: Were materials delivered from La Mesa 
area-that is, plumbing materials to the Schauer-
harner area? 
Answer: In some rare occasions they were. 
This testimony would not support a judgment under 
the "bond la\v" for any certain amount against Mid-Utah 
Broadcasting Company on account of materials furnished 
or claimed to be furnished in the Schauerhamer area. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TO,OK TITLE TO 
PROPER.TIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LA 
MESA FOR AND ON BEHALF O~F RESPO,NDENT OR 
THlAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT FOR 
RESPONDENT, AND WAS CO,RRECT IN REFUSING 
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT APPELLANT IS 
ENTITLEID TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST RE-
SPONDENT IN CO,NNECTION WITH THE PRO~PERTY 
SITUATED IN ROWLEY AND LA MESA AREAS BY 
VIRTUE O,F SECTION 14-2-2 UTAH CO·DE ANNO-
TATED, 1953. (Bond Law) 
In Appellant'~s brief on this point several statements 
are made both directly and inferentially to the effect that 
the evidence established that Mecham was "instructed by 
Grow as agent of Respondent to take title in 'his (Me-
cham's) name and that Respondent would furnish the 
money", and that Respondent was "the real party in in-
terest", thereby inferring that Meoham was Respondent's 
agent. There is no reference in Appellant's brief as to 
where this evidence appears in the record, and such state-
ments or inferences are bald conclusions without basis in 
fact and without consideration of Respondent's testimony. 
(Tr. 714-772). 
In several days of testimony, neither Mecham nor any 
other witness clai,med that Mecham purchased either of the 
two properties mentioned in Appellant's Point IV for Mr. 
Grow or for anyone but himself, and in over 30 depositions 
and 20 days of trial, not one witness claimed that Mecham 
was held out to anyone by Mr. Grow or by Mecham him-
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self as an agent of Respondent or as an agent of Mr. Grow 
or any of the Cross-defendants. 
Appellant's testimony with reference to the ownership 
of the La Mesa and Rowley properties was that it knew 
Keyridge belonged to Grow and La Mesa to Mecham. (Tr. 
629). Mr. Grow categorically stated that he had nothing 
to do with the negotiations for and purchase of the four 
Rowley lots and did not instruct or otherwise counsel Me-
cham to purchase that ground. (Tr. 732). He testified 
precisely tJhe same with regqrd to La Mesa, (Tr. 732), and 
said he did not know of the purchase of either of the 
properties until sometime after Mecham had made his own 
arrangements with the sellers. (Tr. 734). 
Don Rowley, with whom Mecham had his negotia-
tions for the purchase of the Rowley and La Mesa prop-
erties, and one of the Grantors in the deeds of those 
properties to Mecham, (Plf's. Exhibits 128 and 129 Civil 
No. 20,575) said that he was building in the general area 
of those properties when Mecham came by and asked him 
if he knew of any land available in that area. (Tr. 826). 
Rowley further said that Mecham told him that he (Me-
cham) had been building homes in the Schauerhamer 
area "on his own" and that is what he was going to do 
with the Rowley and La Mesa properties. (Tr. 828). 
As heretofore pointed out, the Trial Court found both 
as a Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law that Mecham 
was not the agent of Respondent or any of the Cross-de-
fendants, and we submit that there is no evidence in the 
record which would support a contrary finding. 
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POINT V 
THE CO,URT DID NOT E.RR IN REFUSING TO 
EQUALLY APPORTION APPELLANT'S LIEN. 
It is our position that in a proper case equal appor-
tionment of a lien might be made, particularly where one 
supplier furnishes all of orne type of ~material for a group 
of houses under one ownership, which materials are used 
indiscriminately therein, and where it might be presumed 
that approximately equal value was used in or upon each 
house in the group. We believe also that a lien might be 
apportioned, though not necessarily equally, in a situation 
such as occurred in the Brannan case, (supra), where the 
amount attributable to the parcel liened can be readily cal-
culated or is stipulated to by ,fue parties. 
In the case at bar, however, Appellant contends un-
der his Point V that an ~apportionment, which it refused 
to consider at any time during the pre-trial or trial and 
did nort plead, should have been made on an equal basis 
among 52 of the properties on which Mecham built 1houses, 
although his lien covered 101 improved properties and 
these actions involved only 34. Just horw the 52 figure is 
arrived at is not clear from Appellant's brief on this point, 
but if any apportionment were proper it would have to be 
on the total properties liened and not on the arbitrary fig-
ure of 52. 
It is Respondent's position, however, that no legal, 
equitable, or logical basis for an equal apportionment of 
Appellant's total lien among the 101 properties, or :among 
the 5 separate areas, or as between 58 Keyridge properties 
and the others, is shown by the evidence, and the Court 
was correct in so holding. 
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There is no evidence in the record as to the value of 
materials furnished by Appellant "to be used" in or upon 
or actually used in or upon any one or group of the 34 
properties involved in the three actions before the Court. 
There is no evidence in the record that Appellant furnished 
any materials "to be used" in the Schauerhamer or Row-
ley areas, as it did not deliver to those properties and did 
not even know of the existence of those areas until con-
struction ceased in June, 1H57. (Tr. 651, -652). The only 
evidence that any materials were actually used in those 
areas is Mecham's testimony quoted on page 18 of Appel-
lant's brief wherein Mecham said that "on some rare occa-
sions" materials were delivered from La Mesa to Schauer-
harner, and "some" were delivered from the La Mesa area 
to the Rowley area. Upon that evidence it would appear 
to us that any kind of a logical or reasonable apportion-
ment o[ .A:ppellant's lien would be impossible, especially, 
since other suppliers furnished to Mecham the same type 
of materials. (See Plf's Exhibit 125, Civil No. 20,575, 
wherein it appears that Peerless Utah soJd plumbing sup-
plies to Mecham in the am·ount of $13,560.23 from Novem-
ber 10, 1955 through April 25, 1957. Utah Plumbing Sup-
ply also furnished plumbing materials and was made a 
party Defendant in the La Mesa action.) 
As is said in Jones on Liens, Volume 2, Section 1319, 
cited by Appellant on page 24 of his brief: 
''In ·an action to enforce a lien for labor performed 
on two houses, the fact that the petitioner is not able 
to state the precise share of the labor performed on 
each house does not necessarily defeat his lien against 
each house for such certain amounts of lcubor as they 
are satisfied he performed thereon, alth<>Ug1h they 
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may not be satisfied that he did not perform more." 
(Emphasis ours) 
What "certain" amounts of materials could the Court 
be "satisfied" were furnished to be used upon any or all 
of the properties upon which foreclosure was sought by 
Appellant and Respondent in the cases at bar? What rea-
sonable basis is there in Appellant's evidence to justify an 
assumption that either 1/52 or ljlOlth of the total amount 
of Appellant's materials were furnished "to be used" upon 
the single properties separately foreclosed in the cases be-
fore the Court? 
POINT VI 
RESPONDENT'S RECORDED MORTGAGES GAVE 
CONSTRU·CTIVE NOTICE OF CONTENTS, AS ACK-
NOWLEDGME.NTS WERE FAIR ON THEIR FACES 
AND RECORD TITLE HOLDER, RO~BERT B. ME-
CHAM, PROPERLY EXECUTED AND ACKNOWL-
EDGED THE SAME PRIOR TO RECORDING. 
Appellant makes a point in its brief of the fact that 
Ruth W. Mecham, wife of Robert B. Mecham, did not per-
sonally appear at the office of Respondent on all occasions 
when she signed the mortgages. It is asserted that be-
cause some of the mortgages were signed by her away from 
the presence of the Notary Public and her acknowledge-
ments as to those were taken by telephone, that all the 
mortgages involved in the cases at bar gave no construc-
tive notice to Appellant, and ·hence Appellant's lien is prior 
in right. 
For that argument to be of any benefit to .A!ppellant 
in the cases at bar, the Court must first reverse the Trial 
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Court's holding that Appellant has no enforceable lien, and 
fix the amount thereof as against the properties sought to 
be foreclosed in these actions, and second, must conclude 
that the Appellant had no actual knowledge of the exis-
tence of the mortgages. 
As we have heretofore pointed out and as the Trial 
Court held, no enforceable lien exists, and hence, whether 
or not the mortgages gave constructive notice to Appel-
lant, would be immaterial. Appellant admits in its brief 
that the mortgages were valid as between the parties and 
neither of the Mortgagors ever claimed differently. The 
Utah case o[ Mitchel vs. Palmer, 240 P. (2) 970, 121 Utah 
245, would seem to be decisive on that point. The Court 
held in that case that a deed need not be acknowledged in 
order to be valid as between the parties thereto. 
On the matter of whether Appellant had actual knowl-
edge of the existence of the mortgages, see the testimony 
of Appellant's witness, Jay D. Knudsen, commencing on 
Page 649 of the transcript wherein he insisted that he 
knew as a matter of common knowledge that there were 
mortgages on the property. Section 38-1-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, dealing with the priority of mechanic's 
liens over other encumbrances, makes such liens prior in 
right to a mortgage "of which the lienholder had no no-
tice," .and, therefore, if Appellant says that the existence 
of the mortgages was a matter of common knowledge, it 
knew of the existence of the mortgages and it would make 
no difference whether the recorded mortgages imparted 
constructive notice or not. 
In any event, it is our position that the mortgages in-
volved in these cases did impart constructive notice to Ap-
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pellant and all others \Vho dealt with or concerning the 
property, as will hereinafter appear. 
The evidence shows clearly that all of the thirty-four 
mortgages involved in the three proceedings before the 
Court were executed and acknowledged by Robert B. Me-
cham at the office of Respondent and in the presence of 
the Notaries Public who took his acknowledgements. (Tr. 
839, 847). The record further shows that at the time of 
execution of said mortgages, the record title to the prop-
erty covered by the mortgages was in the name of Rob-
ert B. Mecham (Def. Exhibits 128 and 129, Civil No. 20,-
575) and 'hence, the mortgages were in all respects proper 
and adequate so far as his execution and acknowledge-
ments as record title holder are concerned. 
At the time of signing the mortgages, Mrs. Mecham 
had only an inchoate statutory interest in the property, 
whieh might or might not ripen into ownership rights, de-
pendent upon her survivorship of her husband, Robert B. 
Mecham. At no time in the proceedings did she, as a 
party defendant, deny the execution of said mortgages. 
She further, by telephone, acknowledged the execution 
thereof to a Notary Public who was employed at the of-
fice of Respondent. (Tr. 841). As a result of the fore-
closure proceedings in the District Court, in whieh she 
was a party defendant, all of her inchoate right, title and 
interest in and to the properties was foreclosed. The 
sheriff's sale has been completed and a deed issued con-
veying to Respondent all interest which she might have 
acquired under her statutory right. She has taken no ap-
peal. 
A reading of the Utah statutes makes it clear that ev-
ery prerequisite as to the acknowledgement prior to re-
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cording, in so far as the same relates to Robert B. Mecham, 
has been met. If Mrs. Mecham had not signed the mort-
gages, nevertheless the same would have been adequate 
to give constructive notice of the existence thereof with 
merely the signature of Robert B. Mecham, which was du-
ly acknowledged. The addition of her name thereon did 
not in any manner detract from the validity of the mort-
gages and their recording so as to give constructive notice 
otf the execution by the record title holder. 
Now let us analyze the question raised (which actu-
ally is immaterial in light of the validity of the acknowl-
edgement as to the record title owner, Robert B. Mecham) 
and the cases which have been cited by Appellant regard-
ing the telephonic acknowledement by Mrs. Mecham. Not 
all of Mrs. Mecham's acknowledgements were by telephone, 
as it is admitted that she personally appeared at the of-
fice of Respondent and signed one group of mortgages. 
(Tr. 840, 848). As the mortgages on La Mesa were exe-
cuted in groups of eight, we can safely assume that at least 
eight of the mortgages were signed by her and acknowl-
edged in the presence otf a Notary Public. None of the 
evidence identifies which mortgages were personally ack-
nowledged by her as compared with those which were 
acknowledged by telephone. In view otf the fact that the 
burden of proof is on the Appellant to upset the validity 
of the acknowledgements, we feel that it has failed in its 
burden of proof to identify the particular mortgages. 
Now, assuming that the mortgages which were ack-
nowledged by Mrs. Mecham in response to the telephone 
inquiry of the Notary Public could be identified, do those 
mortgages impart constructive notice to subsequent en-
cumbrancers as to her? We notice that Appellant's brief 
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refers to certain cases in which that issue was considered. 
The ~primary case cited is Myers vs. Ebey, 33 ldaho, 266, 
193 P. 77. In that matter the Idaho statute involved was 
different from our Utah statute in that it dealt specifically 
with a personal acknowledgement by a wife as to proper-
ty claimed to be a homestead of the parties, and prescribed 
that in the absence of such, the document would be void. 
This is very dissimilar to our statute, which does not make 
a defectively acknowledged instrument void. No home-
stead properties are involved either, as these are all lots 
upon which houses were built by Mecham for resale. 'f.he 
Meohams resided on remote and different property and no 
declaration of homestead has been filed on any land in-
volved in these three cases. 
No criticism has been made as to the form of the ack-
nowledgement, and if any defect appears, such is a result 
of extraneous evidence. The general law relating to the 
right of such a document to recordation and the effect of 
giving constructive notice therby is stated in 1 CJS 799 
under the heading of "Acknowledgements" to be: 
"Where 1Jhe acknowledgement is regular on its 
face so that it becomes the duty of the recording offi-
cer to admit the instrument to record, its record will 
afford constructive notice, although there are latent 
or hidden defects in the acknowledgement, as, for ex-
ample, where it was taken before an interested party 
or an executor, or a stockholder, or was taken outside 
the proper county." 
The Utah case of Tarpey vs. Deseret Salt Co., 5 Utah 
205, 14 P. 338 is clearly distinguishable. In that ease the 
instrument had been properly acknowledged, but was not 
witnessed as was then required by statute, and the ommis-
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sion was apparent on the face of the instrument. See an-
notation 59 A.L.R. (2d) 1316; 1 Am. Jur. 228. 
In Utah, the law has been established that one who 
asserts the invalidity of a deed or other document involv-
ing real proerty must prove such invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence. The acknowledgement and recorda-
tion of the document gives rise to a presumption of its 
genuineness, due execution and delivery thereof, and is pri-
ma facie evtdence. These presumptions arising from ack-
nowledgement and recordation, should be given great 
weight and should not be overthrown by a mere prepon-
derance of evidence, but only by clear and convincing proof. 
See Northcrest, Inc. vs. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P. 
(2d) 692; 122 Utah 268. This rule has also been declared 
in other Utah cases which are cited in the one noted above. 
The lower court in the instant case has not found that 
the acknowledgement of Mrs. Mecham was defective, nor 
has the lorwer court found that the mortgages were not en-
titled to recordation, nor has the court found that con-
structive notice was nort given by the presence of said docu-
ments on the official records in the office of the Utah Coun-
ty Recorder. We believe that Appellant not only has failed 
to support its legal theories by authority, but also has 
failed to show that there is in the record clear and con-
vincing proof that some identifiable mortgages are invalid 
for any purpose. 
POINT VII 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CLAIM 
PRIORITY OF ITS MORTGAGES. 
The argument of Appellant in its brief on Point VII 
cites no authority and makes no reference to the transcript 
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or record wherein the "facts" allegedly creating an estoppel 
appear or are found, except in one instance. Furthermore, 
the argument is predicated upon the assumption that Ap-
pellant has a valid and enforceable lien in some ascertain-
able amount or amounts against the properties involved in 
the cases at bar, and which lien, though legally inferior to 
Respondent's mortgages, is nevertheless entitled to pri-
ority by reason of certain acts and conduct of Respond-
ent's agent amounting to an estoppeL 
We do not agree with Appellant's contentions for sev-
eral reasons. 
First, the lien of Appellant is unenforceable as against 
the properties because it is invalid under the law, and be-
cause there is no evidence as to the value of materials cre-
ating a lien which were fwnished "to be used" or actually 
used upon the properties in the cases at bar. Therefore, 
even if Respondent was estopped to assert priority of its 
mortgages, whi1ch we strongly deny, there is still no en-
forceable "liens" on the properties in any ascertainable 
amounts in favor of Appellant. (See Respondent's argu-
ment under Point I and authorities cited therein). To il-
lustrate this point, we respectfully call the Court's attention 
to Respondent's Sixth Cause of Action in Civil No. 20,591, 
involving the Schauerhamer property, wherein the mort-
gage therein sought to be foreclosed, resulting from a re-
financing transaction, is dated June 14, 1957 and was re-
corded June 26, 1957. (R. 67). There is no question, and 
we have always ·conceded, that on that single lot work was 
commenced prior to the recording of the mortgage there-
on and, therefore, any "liens" affecting that property are 
prior in right to that mortgage. The question, then, is: 
does Appellant have a lien upon this property, and if so 
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what is the amount? Is there any evidence in the record 
that any of Appellant's materials were! furnished "to be 
used" in or actually used upon this property exeept the 
testimony of Mecham that upon "some rare occasions" 
materials were taken from La Mesa and used upon Schauer-
harner? In our opinion, Whether Appellant is estopped 
or not es~topped to elaim priority of its mortgages over Ap-
peHant's lien is beside the point, because Appellant failed 
in its burden to establish any lien at all. 
Second, the facts upon which an "estoppel" is claimed 
are not facts found by the Trial C'ourt and for the most 
part are assertions unsupported by the evidence. For ex-
ample, on the question as to whether Mecham was losing 
money in Keyridge see Mecham's testimony commencing 
at page 168 of the Transcript and Defendant's Exhibit 443, 
Civil No. 20,575, wherein he admitted that he had no rec-
ords kept exeept the Exhibit referred to, or any records of 
calculations, and apparently was basing his estimate of los-
ses upon a gener-al assumption that the type of house which 
he was building could not have been built for the contract 
price. In eontrast to this testimony see the testimony of 
William R. Jex, a witness originally called by one of the 
lien claimants as an e~ert in the building of homes in and 
about Utah County. Mr. Jex stated exactly what in his 
opinion it would cost to build the homes which Mecham 
built in the Keyridge area, and in practically every in-
stan~ce the amount which Mr. Jex estimated as the cost of 
building each house was less than the contract price and 
included a ten per cent profit for the contractor. (Tr. 815-
819; see also Plfs. Ex:hibits 42 (1-58) Civil No. 20,575 and 
Plfs. Exhibits 56 1-147) consisting of cancelled checks pay-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
able to Mecham by Cross-defendants totalling in ex~cess of 
the contract prices). 
Even Mecham himself never claimed that he was the 
agent for Mr. Grow, as contended by Appellant, or that 
he purchased any property for and on behalf of Respond-
ent or Mr. Grow or any of the Cross-defendants. Don Row-
ley, from whom Mecham bought the Rorwley and LaMesa 
properties, in his testimony said that Mecham told him he 
had been building homes for Grow or Utah Savings and 
then had gone into the Schauerhamer area on his own, 
and that was what he was going to do with the Rowley 
and La Mesa properties. (Tr. 827,828). 
Mr. D. Spencer Grow said in his testimony commenc-
' ing on page 721 that he asked Mecham to get him a cost 
estimate and pursuant to that request a cost estimate was 
furnished to hi~m on which the prices of the Keyridge prop-
erties were negotiated. He further said on page 731 that 
Mecham told him that some people by the name of Row-
ley owned some acreage located just east of Crystal Acres, 
that he (Mecham) could purchase and give back a mort-
gage, and out of the proceeds orf the sale of homes, could 
pay off the mortgage. (Tr. 731). Mr. Grow denied that 
he had anything to do with the acquisition orf land by Me-
cham from Ruben Schauerhamer and in fact testified that 
Mecham had owned it many mon1Jhs before Mr. Grow even 
knew about it. (Tr. 732). He further said that he had 
nothing to do with the negotiations and purchase of the 
four Rowley lots by Mecham or the La Mesa property and 
that he did not instruct or otherwise counsel Mr. Mecham 
to purchase this ground, or advise him or assist him in the 
negotiatioru; for it. (Tr. 733). The Trial Court found the 
facts substanti~ally as testified to by Mr. Grow. 
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Appellant is not in a position to claim an estoppel 
against anyone, except perhaps Mecham, because upon on-
ly one occasion was inquiry made by it or on its behalf to 
Respondent as to the monies available on the mortgages, 
and that was after construction had virtually ceased. (Tr. 
649, 650). Appellant was then correctly informed that 
there were no balances on the mortgages. If it k:new Re-
spondent was financing Mecham's building and Mecham 
wasn't paying his bills, then some prior inquiries were in 
order. Appellant knew that the ownership of La Mesa 
and Keyridge were different, but even with that knowledge 
failed to keep or insist upon separate accounts as between 
those two prodects. If it relied upon Mecham's statement 
that it made no difference, then if there is any estoppel, it 
would have to be against Mecham and not Respondent. 
In twenty days of trial and in over 30 depositions, not 
a single lien claimant, including any witness for Appellant, 
could or did point to any representation made by Respond-
ent, Cross-defendants, or any of them, whereby any lien 
claimant was misled into extending credit to Mecham, or 
respecting the ownership of any of the properties, either 
covered by Appellant's lien or involved in this law suit. If 
appellant failed to keep adequate records on which to pre-
dicate a lien, it has no one to blame but itself, and we per-
ceive no duty on the part of Respondent to have instruc-
ted Appellant as to the requirements of the mechanics lien 
la\V. 
The unfortunate part of this law suit is that regaro-
less of the ultimate decision, the gross incompetence and 
mis-management of Mecham has been responsible for a 
great economic loss to all of the parties, including Respond-
ent and Cross-defendants, and there is no way in which 
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he can make restitution. As indicated above, the testi-
mony of Mr. W. R. Jex, who was first called as an expert 
by some of the lien claimants indicated that Mecham should 
have been able to pay all of his bills and make a consider-
able profit on the construction which he undertook. Where 
all of the hundreds of thousands of dollars went is still in 
doubt, although an unreasonable proportion of it was un-
doubtedly wasted in labor, pilfering, not needed equipment, 
sales forces whieh sold practically nothing, extensive ad-
vertising, and Mecham's indiscretion in expending monies 
for purposes unrelated to the construction for which the) 
were disbW'sed. (Tr. 399-402, 408-431). Mecham had no 
records, even complete bank statements, which might have 
shed some light on the subject. 
POINT VIII 
APPELLANT HAS NO VALID AND ENFORCE-
ABLE LIEN AGAINST THE PROPERTIES INVOLVED, 
BECAUSE ITS MATERIALS WERE SOLD UPO·N AN 
OPEN ACCOUNT IN THE O·RDINARY COURSE O·F 
TRADE. 
It is clear from the evidence and testimony at the trial, 
the findings of the Trial Court, hereinbefore quoted com-
mencing on page 8 of this brief, and the admissions of 
Appellant in its brief, that the materials sold to Mecham · 
by the Appellant were sold upon an open account in the 
ordinary course of trade and, as a consequence, no lien 
may be asserted against part of the properties on which 
some of the materials thereafter may have been used. ·Un-
til construction had virtually ceased, Appellant was not 
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particularly concerned where its materials were going. 
(Tr. 628, 625-627). 
In the case of B. F. Salzer Lumber Co. vs. Linden-
mei~er, 131 P. 442, the c·olorado Supreme Court held that in 
nrder to sustain a lien upon the property, it must appear 
that the materials were expressly furnished and delivered 
for use in constructing a specified building. In that case, 
the contractor was engaged in building two structures for 
differenrt owners and lumber furnished to the contractor 
by the Hen claimant was used in both structures. The 
lumber company filed a claim of lien upon both the build-
ings, but afterwards abandoned the elaim on one of them. 
The secretary of the company said that he did not know 
in which of these buildings the material ·had been used 
until afte[' the completiorn of the buildings. The Court 
held that no lien could attaoh under these circumstances. 
In the case of W. P. Fuller & Co. vs. Flisher, 218 P. 
53, the California Court, under a statute in all material re-
spects similar to the one in the State of Utah, held that 
it is the furnishing of materials to be used or consumed 
in the ·construction, alteration, addition or repair O!f the 
partieular building upon Which the lien is claimed, that 
creates the lien. The statute does not contemplate that 
a lumber merchant should have the right to follow the 
material which he has sold to another, in general terms, 
and assert a lien upon any building to which the materials 
may have happened to have been applied. The Court fur-
ther stated that in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, it 
not only must be alleged and proved by the Plaintiff that 
the materials were actually used or consumed in the con-
struction, alteration, addition to or repair of the building, 
but it also must be averred and proved that the material 
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was furnished by the materialmen expressly for that par-
ticular building. 
The Washington Supreme Court in Whittier vs. Pu-
get Sound Loan Company, 30 P. 1094, held under a Wash-
ington statute providing that every person furnishing ma-
terials to be used in the construction of any buildings shall 
have a lien therefor, that a mechanic's lien cannot be main-
tained against the owner of a building for materials used 
in its construction which are furnished a contractor when 
the claimant has no knowledge of any contract relations 
existing between the contractor and owner, nor of the par-
ticular building to be constructed, but intends to hold what-
ever building the materials were used in as security. 
The language used in the case of Eisenbeis vs. Work-
man, 28 P. 923, is stronger. There, the Court said that the 
plain import of the language of the statute giving a me-
chanic's lien is that ~the materials must be furnished to be 
used in a particular building upon which the lien is claimed. 
The intention must have existed to claim the lien when the 
merchandise was sold, and reliance had and credit ex-
tended partially, aJt least, by reason of the fact that the 
materi~al was to be used in the construction of a building, 
and it must have been so furnished. 
See 36 Am. Jur., page 62, wherein appears the foHow-
ing Statement: 
"The lien is acquired, therefor, only when the ma-
terials are furnished with an understanding that they 
are to be used for a purpose named in the statute, and 
not when they are supplied under an ordinary sale on 
credit or on an open account although the buyer may 
actually use them in a building or improvement.'' 
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In a footnote to the annotation in 39 A.L.R. (2d) on 
page 397, the writer says: 
"It would seem to be the general rule that mate-
rials must have been sold or furnished for the pur-
pose of being used in a particular building against 
which the lien is claimed, in order to sustain a lien, 
and, conversely, that no lien may be acquired for ma-
terial furnished for general purposes, or sold in the 
ordinary course af trade." 
On facts more flavorable to the lien claimant than the 
facts in this ease, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held 
in the case of Tabet vs. Davenport, 260 P. (2d) 722, that 
a lien claimant must allocate materials sold to a particular 
building at the ti~me of sale in order to foreclose a lien. 
It is not sufficient that allocation be made by a claimant 
after the sale of materials has taken place, as was done in 
this case. ( Tr. 651) . 
POINT IX 
IF MEC'IIJANIC'S LIENS. IN FAVOR OF APPEL-
LANT ARE DETERMINED TO BE VALID IN SOME 
ASCERTAINABLE AMOUNTS AGAINST THE PROP-
ERTIES INVOLVED, THE MORTGAGES· OF RE-
SPONDENT WOULD IN ANY SUCH EVENT BE PRI-
OR IN RIGHT TO SUCH LIENS. 
Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back 
to, and take effect as orf. the time of the commence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the construction or improvement, and shall have 
priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance 
whieh may have attached subsequently to the time 
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when the building, improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the building, struc-
ture or improvement was ·commenced, work begun, or 
first materials furnished on the ground." (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Tthe ~oregoing statute provides in effect that me-
chanic's liens attach when the first work is done or the 
first materials are furnished on the ground for the struc-
ture or improvement, and has priority over a mortgage 
which subsequently attaches thereto. Conversely, a mort-
gage which has "attached" prior to the commencement of 
work or the furnishing of materials on the ground is prior 
in right to mechanic's lien. 
The Trial Court found specifically in all three cases 
that no work was commenced or materials furnished on 
the ground prior to the time the mortgages were recorded, 
except on the lot described in Respondent's Sixth Cause 
of Action in Civil No. 20,591. The evidence is susceptible 
of no other conclusion. (Tr. 854-860, 866-869; R. 103, 
Civil No. 20,575; R. 23, Civil No. 20,591; R. 72, Civil No. 
20,592; Plf. Exhibirt 45, Civil No. 20,575). 
As to the property described in the Sixth Cause of 
Action, Respondent admits and concedes that any mechan-
ic's lien for rna terials furnished ''to be used'' or actually 
used upon that property is prior to the mortgage there-
upon. As to all other properties, it is clear that the mort-
gages "attached" within the meaning of Section 38-1-5, 
UCA, 1953, at the time of their recordation, and art such 
time, no work having been commenced and no materials 
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having been furnished, Appellant's "iien" if any, is ex-
pressly rendered inferior in right. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant failed in any of the three cases on this ap-
peal to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a claim 
or interest in any of the properties described in Respond-
ent's complaints, or to establish any claims against Re-
spondent or Cross-defendants or any of them, and the Trial 
Court committed no reversible error in so holding. 
There being no manifest showing by Appellant that the 
Trial Court misappiied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence, such findings, 
and conclusions based thereon, should not be set aside. 
First Security Bank of Utah vs. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 
P. (2d) 297. 
Even if the Court were wrong, however, in holding 
that Appellant has no valid and enforceable liens in ascer-
tainable amounts against the properties in the cases at 
bar, such would not be prejudicial error for the reason that 
such liens could not be prior to the mortgages by virtue 
of Section 31-1-5, UCA, 1953. Since the propemies involved 
herein were not .sold upon foreclosure sale for any amounts 
in excess of the ·amounts found due on Respondent's mort-
gages, Appellant could have no right to any of the pro-
ceeds from such sales. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH, BULLOCK & NELSON, 
and 
PUGSLEY. HAYES, RAMPTON & 
WATKISS, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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